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The development of quantum networks will be paramount towards practical and secure
telecommunications. These networks will need to sign and distribute information between
many parties with information-theoretic security, requiring both quantum digital signatures
(QDS) and quantum key distribution (QKD). Here, we introduce and experimentally realise a
quantum network architecture, where the nodes are fully connected using a minimum
amount of physical links. The central node of the network can act either as a totally untrusted
relay, connecting the end users via the recently introduced measurement-device-independent
(MDI)-QKD, or as a trusted recipient directly communicating with the end users via QKD.
Using this network, we perform a proof-of-principle demonstration of QDS mediated by MDI-
QKD. For that, we devised an efficient protocol to distil multiple signatures from the same
block of data, thus reducing the statistical fluctuations in the sample and greatly enhancing
the final QDS rate in the finite-size scenario.
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Cryptography is ubiquitous in modern society and essentialto countless applications relying on the confidentiality,integrity and non-repudiation of sensible data1. Currently,
the security of these applications is largely based on public-key
cryptography2, 3, which is supposedly secure against an eaves-
dropper with limited computational power. Quantum key dis-
tribution (QKD), on the other hand, poses no restrictions on the
attacker, apart from obeying the laws of nature, and one only
makes assumptions on the devices owned by the authorised users,
which can be directly tested4. In addition, the recent introduction
of measurement device independent (MDI)-QKD5, 6 further
enhances the positive features of QKD. By clever use of the tel-
eportation gate7, MDI-QKD turns the receiving side of QKD into
a transmitter, thus removing all the security assumptions on the
detecting devices, which are arguably most exposed to external
attacks8–12. Moreover, it allows two parties to connect through a
totally untrusted node, which is particularly important in a net-
work configuration13. Recent experiments have shown that it can
be implemented with key rates commensurate to those of QKD14,
while extending its transmission distance15.
Different from encryption, digital signatures play a vital role in
software distribution, modern communication and financial
transactions, where the integrity of the data against forgery is of
utmost importance. While they are currently implemented using
public-key cryptography, quantum digital signatures (QDS) have
recently been introduced16–18 to allow users to sign a document
by quantum means and transfer it to other users with
information-theoretical security. Quantum signatures were
introduced in ref. 16, but that scheme was impractical as it
required the use of a quantum memory. Recent developments
have removed this limitation17, 18 and made the QDS techniques
closer to those employed in QKD19 and MDI-QKD20. The
resulting schemes, however, have limitations. The one in ref. 19
needs essentially one QKD link for each pair of users taking part
in the distribution of QDS. In a network with N users, this would
amount to N(N − 1)/2 direct physical links, an impractically high
number for a large number of users. In the configuration
described in ref. 20, on the other hand, a central node connects
pairs of users via MDI-QKD, but cannot directly communicate
with them. So a simple yet crucial operation like a digitally signed
firmware update from the central node to the end users would be
impossible with this scheme.
Here, we propose and experimentally realise a quantum net-
work concept to overcome all of the above limitations. The net-
work can connect three users by means of only two optical links,
entailing a favourable scaling of N − 1 links for an N-node
network. This is achieved by configuring the central node as an
entirely untrusted relay that connects the end users via MDI-
QKD. However, the central node can also be reconfigured so to
act as a trusted recipient and communicate directly and securely
with the end users via QKD. Because the network is fully con-
nected, we could use it to distil quantum encryption keys and
quantum digital signatures between all pairs of users. In parti-
cular, this allows us to extract the first QDS rates mediated by
MDI-QKD. Using newly adapted finite-size distillation protocols
(all details are given in Supplementary Note 1), we obtain key
rates around 104 bits per second (bps) for MDI-QKD on a 50-km
optical fibre and 106 bps for QKD on a 25-km optical fibre, as
well as an MDI-QKD-mediated QDS rate of 1 signed bit every 45
s and a QKD-mediated QDS rate of 1 signed bit every 72 ms. This
performance would enable high-speed applications in future
quantum networks.
Results
System schematics. The schematics of the network are shown in
Fig. 1. Two distant users, Alice and Bob, are connected through a
central node, Charlie, who normally acts as an untrusted relay
between the users. In this case, the confidentiality of the com-
munication between Alice and Bob is guaranteed by the fact that
they use the two intensity modulators (IM) to run the decoy-
state21–24 MDI-QKD protocol6. The resulting key will then be
unknown to Charlie and to any external eavesdropper, and secure
against attacks directed at Charlie’s equipment. To let Alice and
Bob communicate directly with Charlie, point-to-point QKD
links can be activated, as explained shortly. If the users’ devices
are trusted, the transmission in the QKD modality will feature
quantum security against external eavesdroppers and will be fast,
with megabits of key material distributed every second. In the
scheme in Fig. 1, a QKD transmission between Alice (Bob) and
Charlie is enabled by stopping the light emitted by Bob (Alice)
through the same IMs employed for the decoy-state MDI-QKD
protocol. Hence, the IMs are key components in the setup,
allowing switching between QKD and MDI-QKD and, simulta-
neously, the implementation of the decoy-state technique. The
possibility to switch between QKD and MDI-QKD constitutes a
“reconfigurable MDI/QKD network”, a concept similar to the one
introduced in ref. 25 for free-space quantum communications.
Experimental setup. To implement the network in Fig. 1, we
adopt a polarisation-based setup. We denote by H, V, D and A the
horizontal, vertical, diagonal and anti-diagonal states of linear
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Fig. 1 Fibre-based MDI/QKD network. The key elements are coloured red. The rotator (R) in Charlie’s station sets each detector to measure a different
polarisation state, H horizontal, V vertical, D diagonal and A anti-diagonal. The intensity modulators (IMs) can be set to high attenuation, to nearly stop the
light passing through them (“Stop” in the figure). This can enable Alice-Bob MDI-QKD, when no IM is set to Stop, or Alice-Charlie QKD, when Bob’s IM is
set to Stop, or Bob-Charlie QKD, when Alice’s IM is set to Stop. At the same time, the IMs can be used to prepare decoy states21–24. PM polarisation
modulation; BS beam splitter; PBS polarising beam splitter
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polarisation, respectively, and with Z and X the rectilinear and
diagonal bases, composed of the states {H, V} and {D, A},
respectively. The setup makes use of the decoy-state technique to
improve the key rate and extend the transmission distance.
Therefore, the preparation step also includes the selection of the
intensity of the pulses to be sent to Charlie. In this case, we adopt
the scheme with four intensity classes14, 26, indicated as s (“sig-
nal”), u (“decoy1”), v (“decoy2”) and w (“vacuum”). The signal s
is the only one prepared in the Z basis, whereas u, v and w are all
prepared in the X basis. The quantum keys and signatures are
extracted from the s pulses in the Z basis, whereas the X basis is
for testing the quantum channel against the presence of an
eavesdropper. To increase the final key rate, the basis Z is selected
more often than X.
The preparation of the pulses in the experimental setup is
effected through the transmitter depicted in Fig. 2. Alice and Bob
create low-jitter 32-ps light pulses at 1549.8 nm using the pulsed
laser seeding technique14. The master laser is input to the slave
via a circulator and the AC voltage is temporally offset between
the two lasers to ensure injection occurs at the correct time. The
1-GHz gain switching of both lasers ensures that all pulses are
phase randomised27, 28. Alice and Bob’s pulses are then passed
through separate 30 GHz bandwidth filters to remove noise. The
polarisation of the pulses is controlled using electric polarisation
controllers, which can create all of the required polarisation
states. An attenuator provides the four photon fluxes (s, u, v, w)
before they are sent to Charlie.
Charlie is composed of the interfering beam splitter (BS), two
polarising BS (PBS) aligned along the Z axis, one polarisation
rotator (R) and four InGaAs self-differencing avalanche photo-
diodes, run at room temperature, clocked at 1 GHz and featuring
an average efficiency of 20.9%. The rotator R placed after one
output port of Charlie’s BS turns a Z-basis analyser into an
X-basis analyser. This is important for enabling reconfigurable
MDI/QKD as it allows the realisation of a full QKD receiver,
measuring the incoming pulses in two complementary bases.
On the other hand, all the coincidence counts from detectors
H and V can be treated as in the original MDI-QKD scheme,
whereas coincidence counts from detectors on different output
ports of Charlie’s BS cannot be used to distil key bits, as
they belong to different bases. A coincidence count between H
and V indicates projection onto the triplet Bell state
ψþj i ¼ 1= ffiffi2p HVj i þ VHj ið Þ ¼ 1= ffiffi2p DDj i  AAj ið Þ. In this
case, Bob flips (does not flip) his bit to match Alice’s bit if the
rectilinear (diagonal) basis was used in the preparation step. The
same argument applies to the X-basis branch, by replacing H with
D and V with A. Alice, Bob and Charlie share a common
reference clock, allowing Alice and Bob to align their pulses, so to
arrive coincidentally at Charlie, and allowing Charlie to align his
detectors.
To effect the selection between MDI-QKD and QKD, Alice and
Bob act on their IMs to send or stop the light directed to Charlie.
In particular, when Alice (Bob) prepares the vacuum state w, the
amount of light travelling towards Charlie is so small that the
situation is virtually identical to having the AC (BC) link
disconnected and QKD enabled on the BC (AC) link. Any
potential residual light in the vacuum state does not affect the
security of the scheme, as it directly translates into an increase of
the measured quantum bit error rate (QBER). Also, if there are
multiple counts in Charlie’s detectors during the QKD sessions,
they can be treated using the squashing model for the passive
BB84 protocol29, 30. Finally, in some cases, neither Alice nor Bob
will prepare a vacuum state, whereas in other cases they both will.
Such instances can be employed to enable an MDI-QKD
communication (see details in Supplementary Note 1).
Key rates for encryption. Using the described setup, we run
QKD and MDI-QKD experiments, deriving key rates vs. distance,
as depicted in Fig. 3. We performed two sets of experiments. In
the first, we used variable optical attenuators to simulate a lossy
channel with 0.2 dB/km, as in a typical optical fibre at 1550 nm.
In the second, we used two 25-km reels of a standard optical fibre.
The circles (squares) are for the attenuator-based MDI-QKD link
(QKD links), whereas the stars represent the points obtained
using a real fibre. Finally, the solid lines are theoretical simula-
tions tailored to our experimental setup. Tables containing all the
measured counts are reported in Supplementary Tables.
From Fig. 3, it is apparent that the theory reproduces the
experimental results well, both for attenuators and real fibre, with
only a slightly lower experimental rate for the fibre due to a
correspondingly higher QBER. This allowed us to use a
simulation to optimise the system before performing real
experiments. The key rates for MDI-QKD are between 606 bps
for an equivalent distance of 90 km and 134 kbps for 0 km. QKD
is faster, providing key rates ranging from about 0.5 Mbps at 45
km to almost 5 Mbps at 0 km. This difference in the key rates led
us to set the probability of an MDI-QKD run equal to 500 times
that of a QKD run. In a network with three users, this would
provide comparable key rates for all users, on average, over all
distances. Before performing the experiment, the setup was
optimised for MDI-QKD. Then, key rates were acquired for both
MDI-QKD and QKD without additional calibrations.
Key rates in Fig. 3 were calculated using composable security
proofs in the finite-size scenario31, 32 with a procedure similar to
the one described in ref. 14. With the proviso that the key bits are
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Fig. 2 Transmitting module. Two replicas of the depicted fibre-based setup are used by Alice and Bob to transmit light pulses to Charlie. Master and slave
lasers’ driving signals are displayed alongside the equipment and are set differently for the two lasers. A power metre connected to the output beam splitter
attenuates the outgoing optical pulses to the correct level. The wavelength filter (λ) is for enhancing the indistinguishability of Alice’s and Bob’s photons
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extracted in the Z basis, we drop the index Z and write them as:
RMDI ¼ S1;1 1 h e1;1ph
 h i
 leakMDIEC  ΔMDI; ð1Þ
RQKD ¼ S1 1 h e1ph
 h i
 leakQKDEC  ΔQKD: ð2Þ
In Eqs. (1) and (2), the labels “MDI” and “QKD” refer to MDI-
QKD and QKD, respectively. The quantities S and eph indicate
single-photon counts and single-photon phase-error rate,
respectively, in the Z basis and intensity class s, estimated by
applying the decoy-state technique to the X-basis data sample and
then extending to the Z basis using standard statistical tools (see
Supplementary Note 1). The function h is the binary entropy. The
upper and lower bars are for upper and lower bounds and the
superscripts “1” or “1,1” refer to one sender (QKD) or two
senders (MDI-QKD) emitting single photons. The quantity
leakEC is the amount of bits used to correct errors in the Z basis,
while the Δ terms take into account the finite-size effect.
Quantum digital signatures. Having demonstrated the capability
to distil encryption keys between all the nodes in the network, we
now turn on QDS and describe specifically our method to extract
QDS rates from an MDI-QKD link. This is not a trivial extension
of the previous cases because, differently from encryption, the
goal of digital signatures is demonstrating the authenticity of a
signed message to multiple recipients rather than keeping it
secret. So the quantum protocols devised for encryption keys have
to be adapted to QDS (see Supplementary Note 1).
So far, various proof-of-concept experiments have been
performed on QDS33–35, with the most recent ones reaching
distances up to 90 km in optical fibre35. However, this was
achieved using a protocol secure only against individual attacks in
the asymptotic scenario. Moreover, previous schemes were either
realised over very short distances33, 34 or on a single optical fibre
to represent two of the three necessary links for QDS35. Finally,
no previous experiment has used MDI-QKD to implement QDS.
In the simplest case, a QDS scheme involves three parties, as
depicted in Fig. 4. One of them, Alice, signs a document and
sends it to a receiver, Bob, who accepts it after checking that the
signature is genuine. The same document can also be transferred
to a third user, Charlie, for verification purposes. We implement
QDS using the quantum network in Fig. 1. Two 25-km optical
fibres connect Alice and Bob to Charlie, whereas there is no direct
fibre between Alice and Bob, who are linked only by the
intermediate node using MDI-QKD. We choose this particular
realisation of QDS to demonstrate signature distribution based on
MDI-QKD. However, given the key rates represented by stars in
Fig. 3, we could also have used the setup with the signing party at
the “Charlie” node, in which case MDI-QKD would be used to
encrypt the symmetrising exchange of signature bits between the
two recipients at the “Alice” and “Bob” nodes. Therefore, our
demonstration is not limited to the particular case represented in
Fig. 4. Let us also remark that, to strengthen our demonstration,
we used real fibre to perform the QDS experiment.
102
101
100
104
103
104
103
0 20 40 60 80
Bob – Charlie (QKD)
Alice – Charlie (QKD)
Alice – Bob (MDI)
S
ec
ur
e 
ke
y 
ra
te
 (
kb
ps
)
Distance (km)
Fig. 3 Secure key rates vs. distance. MDI-QKD (top diagram) and QKD
(centre and bottom diagrams) secure key rates for a Z (X) basis probability
equal to 80% (20%) and a security parameter ϵsec ≲ 10−10 are shown as a
function of distance. Because the reconfigurable scheme is symmetrically
deployed, the distance between Alice and Bob (top) is approximately twice
the distance between Alice and Charlie (centre) and Bob and Charlie
(bottom). All the distances have been calculated assuming 0.2 dB/km
attenuation on the channel, except for the data points indicated by stars,
where a real fibre was used. The projected time to attain the shown key
rates is 25 h of which 3 min are spent on QKD and the rest on MDI-QKD, to
balance their key rates. The fitting lines are the result of a numerical
simulation with the parameters mentioned above and the following
additional ones: Charlie’s insertion loss, 1.1 dB; detectors’ efficiency and
temperature, 20% and 0°, respectively; afterpulsing, 4%; dark count
probability per gate, 1.6 × 10−5; error correction coefficient, 1.16
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Fig. 4 MDI-QKD-mediated QDS. The signature is sent by Alice to Bob using an MDI-QKD setup, over an optical fibre with a total length of 50 km. The
protocol is denoted “MDI-QKD\EP”, where “\EP” stands for “without error correction and privacy amplification”. QKD\EP is used to send a signature from
Alice to Charlie, whereas full QKD is used to distribute keys between Bob and Charlie to allow for the symmetrisation step of QDS (see Supplementary
Note 1). The QKD links are implemented with two 25-km reels of single-mode fibre
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To demonstrate QDS mediated by MDI-QKD, we adopt MDI-
QKD without error correction and privacy amplification (denoted
“MDI-QKD\EP”) for the signature between Alice and Bob, and
QKD without error correction and privacy amplification (QKD
\EP) for the signature between Alice and Charlie. Full QKD
between Bob and Charlie is also used, to enable the symmetrisa-
tion step of the protocol (see Supplementary Note 1 for details).
All the results in the X basis are publicly revealed, whereas only a
small portion of the Z basis results is disclosed, to estimate the
QBER in this basis. The remaining undisclosed bits are used for
quantum digital signatures.
Quantum digital signature rates. Here, we extract the specific
parameters of a QDS protocol, i.e., the size of signatures and the
security parameters against forging and non-repudiation19, 20. For
that, we introduce a protocol with a refined finite-size analysis, to
increase the QDS rate. In the finite-size scenario, the users acquire
data for a finite amount of time, until the data block is large
enough to guarantee small statistical fluctuations in the para-
meters estimated from the data set. Then they proceed and
acquire the next block of data. The current approach for QDS is
to distil a single signature from every block of data. Therefore, to
increase the QDS rate, it is optimal to keep the data block as small
as possible, so as to have more blocks in a given time interval.
This, however, is highly inefficient. It makes statistical fluctua-
tions larger, thus worsening the estimation of the quantum-
related parameters and the QDS rate.
In our protocol, we still perform a single decoy-state parameter
estimation per each block of data, but we extract multiple
signatures from the same data block (see details in Supplementary
Note 1). This allows us to acquire a large data set, minimising the
statistical fluctuations, and at the same time distil as many
signatures as possible from each acquired block. We estimate that
this improves the standard QDS rate by about 10 times at short
distances and even more at longer distances.
We start from analysing the MDI-QKD-mediated QDS rate on
the link connecting Alice and Bob. Then, we will apply an
analogous procedure in order to estimate the QDS rate on the
QKD link between Alice and Charlie. The QDS protocol also
includes a symmetrization step between Bob and Charlie
performed on a secure channel (see Supplementary Note 1 for
details)19, 20. This can be enabled by running QKD on the
remaining link between Bob and Charlie. The specific key rate for
this scheme would be the one showed in the bottom diagram of
Fig. 3.
As a first QDS-specific quantity, we evaluate the minimum rate
pMDIE at which Eve can introduce errors on the MDI-QKD link.
This is given by:
h pMDIE
  ¼ S1;1sig =Cs;ssig 1 h e1;1ph;sig
 h i
; ð3Þ
which is derived from Eq. (1), omitting the error correction and,
for simplicity, the finite-size terms20. In Eq. (3), the subscript
“sig” indicates that the quantities refer to the block from which
signatures are extracted. In the QDS protocol, Alice randomly
selects Cs;ssig ¼ 2:5 ´ 106 bits from the Z-basis block, to form one of
the signature blocks. Because this size is smaller than the Z-basis
data set, she will be able to extract multiple signature blocks from
it, all with size Cs;ssig. She then applies decoy-state estimation to
find, for the signature block, the lower bound for Charlie’s counts
due to single-photon pulses and the corresponding upper bound
for the phase-error rate. In our experiment, the two bounds are
S1;1sig ¼ 666; 345 bits and e1;1ph;sig ¼ 0:053, respectively, leading to
pMDIE = 0.0286.
The next step is to determine an upper bound for the QBER in
the signature blocks, E
s;s
sig. For that, the QBER was directly
measured on a sample set of Cs;stest ¼ 1; 714; 426 bits and found to
be Es;stest ¼ 0:5% (see also Supplementary Table 3). The measured
block can be thought of as a random sample drawn from the
overall Z-basis population. Therefore, the measured QBER is
representative of the QBER in the non-measured fraction of the
population. From this fraction, the users select several blocks of
size Cs;ssig to form the signatures. The QBER in each signature block
is then estimated, by applying Serfling’s inequality36, to be:
E
s;s
sig ¼ Es;stest þ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
Cs;ssig þ 1
 
Cs;ssig þ Cs;stest
 
2Cs;stest C
s;s
sig
 2 ln 1=ϵHð Þ
vuuuut : ð4Þ
The estimation in Eq. (4) provides E
s;s
sig ¼ 0:0085 when we set ϵH
= 2 × 10−11. After calculating suitable authentication and verifica-
tion parameters, sab= 0.0152 and svb= 0.0219, we obtain the
length of a signature LMDIsig by inverting the relation
PMDIrep  exp  svb  sabð Þ2LMDIsig =4
h i
 0:5 ´ 1010; ð5Þ
which sets the repudiation probability PMDIrep to less than
0.5 × 10−10 19, 20. The resulting value for LMDIsig is 2.11 × 10
6,
which is smaller than the set value of Cs;ssig, showing that Eq. (5)
holds in our experiment when we take Cs;ssig as the signature length.
The overall failure probability at the end of the QDS distillation is
less than 10−10, which is orders of magnitude smaller than in
previous experiments33–35.
A signature of size Cs;ssig can be generated with our system in 45
s on average. This is a remarkable speed for MDI-QKD-mediated
QDS, if the increased security level entailed by the MDI-QKD
link, by the lower failure probability and by the finite-size security
against the most general attacks is taken into account. The
average time results from the ratio of the total acquisition time in
an experiment with an 80:20 bias between the Z and the X bases
divided by the 1974 different signatures generated from the
acquired data block. The reported average time includes the QKD
operations on the other two links.
The analysis of MDI-QKD-based signatures is completed by
calculating the probabilities of honest abort, Phab, and forging,
Pfor, which are confirmed to be much smaller than the set
threshold 10−10 with our experimental parameters.
As an additional step in the QDS scheme, we now evaluate the
QDS rate on the 25-km QKD link between Alice and Charlie (see
Fig. 4). We repeat similar calculations as for the MDI-QKD link.
We set the size of the signature block to Cssig ¼ 150;000 bits,
randomly selected in the Z-basis data block acquired by operating
QKD on the AC link. In the signature block, the lower bound for
Charlie’s counts due to single-photon pulses amounts to S1sig ¼
86;563 and the upper bound for the phase-error rate is
e1ph;sig ¼ 0:0237, leading to p
QKD
E = 0.105.
The actual QBER in the Z basis was measured on a sample of
46, 979, 354 bits and amounts to Estest ¼ 0:0017 (see also
Supplementary Table 2). From it, using an equation similar to
Eq. (4), we obtain an upper bound E
s
sig ¼ 0:0108, which is less
than p
QKD
E , thus providing a positive QDS rate. To determine the
rate, we calculate sac= 0.0421 and svc= 0.0734 and obtain a
signature length LQKDsig ¼ 103; 336 by inverting an equation
similar to Eq. (5), but with pQKDrep replacing p
MDI
rep . The total
repudiation probability is then given by the sum pQKDrep þ pMDIrep .
The total time the system would spend acquiring QKD data on
the AC link is about 36 s. The resulting data block would be
enough to distil signatures for 2506 1-bit messages, thus
providing an average time for the QKD-only operations on the
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AC link equal to 72 ms for each signed bit. A similar value of 74
ms could have been obtained on the QKD link between Bob and
Charlie if we had used it to distil signatures rather than for
encryption. Although the reported values can be further
improved by optimising the initial parameters set by Alice and
Bob, they are already in line with state-of-the-art QDS, especially
when considering the fact that the present scheme offers security
in the finite-size scenario against the most general attack allowed
by the laws of physics.
Real-world implementation. As a final point, let us briefly dis-
cuss the possibility to export our methods to a real-world plat-
form. Our quantum network features a majority of QKD links,
used to distil information-theoretically secure encryption keys
and digital signatures for the network’s users. This would ease the
transition to a real-world system, as QKD offers excellent stabi-
lity37 and has already been implemented in field trials38–40. The
polarisation encoding used in our setup has been used in previous
quantum communications experiments and is controllable with
high accuracy41. The polarisation drift is negligible in our
laboratory for the duration of the experiment. Similar or more
favourable conditions are expected in underground fibres42,
where the polarisation drift is not a limiting factor. The necessary
synchronisation of the signals has been demonstrated in the QKD
field trials as well as in an MDI-QKD network13. The effect of
stray photons due to the multiplexing of classical signals can be
also effectively handled, either using two different fibres37 or
multiplexing the clock and data signals with the quantum signals.
Distances up to 200 km have been reached in this configuration43.
Finally, the stringent mode-matching conditions necessary for
high-speed MDI-QKD have been recently considerably relaxed
using laser seeding44, 45, which is the same enabling technology
adopted in this work (see Fig. 2). For these reasons, we would not
expect a major reduction of the rates presented in Fig. 3 if we
turned our setup into a prototype suitable for long-term
deployment in the field, as it contains already the necessary
enabling technology.
Methods
Experimental details. Alice and Bob use the experimental setup shown in Fig. 2 to
independently produce 32 ps pulses at 1549.8 nm. The two parties create low-jitter
(1.7 ps) signals using pulsed laser seeding. To enable this, the master and slave laser
in each source are driven by an AC bias and a DC bias. The AC biases are equal,
however the DC bias for the master laser is higher than that of the slave laser. This
ensures that the master laser has a shorter turn-on time, emitting longer pulses of
around 250 ps. The master laser is input to the slave via a circulator and the AC
bias is temporally offset between the two lasers to ensure injection occurs at the
correct time. Each of the laser diodes are independently temperature controlled to
ensure the emission wavelengths are stable and identical. The 1 GHz gain switching
of both lasers ensures that all pulses are perfectly phase randomised.
Alice and Bob’s pulses are then passed through 30 GHz bandwidth filters to
remove noise. The polarisation of the pulses is controlled using an electric
polarisation controller, which can create all of the required polarisation states. The
polarisation is set once prior to each measurement using Charlie’s detectors as a
reference for each polarisation state. The polarisation drift is negligible for the
duration of the data acquisition due to the controlled temperature of the
laboratory.
An attenuator provides the four photon fluxes (s, u, v, w) before they are sent to
Charlie. Following this, fixed optical attenuators simulate a lossy channel at all
distances reported in Fig. 3, assuming the loss rate is 0.2 dB/km as in a standard
single-mode optical fibre in the third telecom window. In one case, we replaced
attenuators with real optical fibre. The star points in Fig. 3 were obtained using two
25-km reels of standard optical fibre, one connecting Alice’s setup to Charlie and
the other connecting Bob to Charlie. The photon flux of the u state is set for each
distance to produce 5.8 × 106 photons/s at Charlie’s detectors to avoid saturation of
the single-photon counter. An emulator incorporating finite-key size analysis is
then used to determine the optimal photon fluxes of the other states to maximise
the MDI-QKD key rate.
Alice, Bob and Charlie share a common 10-MHz reference clock. This is then
regenerated to the master clock frequency of 1 GHz at each of the users. This allows
Alice and Bob to precisely overlap their optical pulses on Charlie’s BS and at the
same time permits Charlie to time align the detector gates to the received optical
pulses. This is the same method employed in QKD experiments37, 43 and QKD field
trials39, 43 to distribute the clock between the users. In some cases37, the clock is
distributed using two different fibres. In other cases43, the clock is multiplexed with
the quantum channel in the same optical fibre.
At Charlie’s side, the photons from Alice and Bob interfere on a BS. One output
is incident on a PBS and the other output passes through a fixed 45° polarisation
rotator before travelling to a different PBS. With this design, one arm detects
photons in the rectilinear basis and the other arm detects photons in the diagonal
basis. The overall insertion loss of Charlie’s setup up to this point is 1 dB. The
outputs from the PBS’s are detected by four InGaAs self-differencing avalanche
photodiodes. These detectors are gated at 1 GHz and have an intrinsic deadtime of
1 ns. They feature an average efficiency of 20.9%, a dark count rate of 16 kHz and
an afterpulsing probability of 3.9%. They are maintained at a temperature of 273 K
for all measurements. The resultant signals, when neither party is transmitting in
the Z basis, are counted in real time using a multiple-event time digitizer with 100
ps time bins and a saturation value of 6.5 × 106 counts/s. Counts when either party,
or both parties, are sending the Z-basis state are detected on an oscilloscope and
analysed with Matlab because the high-photon levels would saturate the digitizer.
The single counts, coincidence counts and transmitted photon fluxes are collected
at each distance for analysis.
Data availability. The data that support the findings of this study are available
from the corresponding author on reasonable request.
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